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Summary
Declaring it necessary to bring to justice those responsible for the terrorist
attacks on the United States of September 11, 2001, President Bush signed a Military
Order (M.O.) authorizing the trial by military commission of certain non-citizens.
The order directs the Secretary of Defense to establish the procedural rules for the
operation of the military commissions convened pursuant to the M.O. The
Department of Defense prepared regulations providing for procedures of military
commissions, but these were invalidated by the Supreme Court in Hamdan v.
Rumsfeld.  The Bush Administration has proposed legislation to reinstate military
commissions for the trials of suspected terrorists. 
This report provides a brief overview of procedural rules applicable in selected
historical and contemporary tribunals for the trials of war crimes suspects.  The chart
that follows compares selected procedural safeguards employed in criminal trials in
federal criminal court with parallel protective measures in military general courts-
martial, international military tribunals used after World War II, including the
International Military Tribunal (IMT or “Nuremberg Tribunal”), and the International
Criminal Courts for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and Rwanda (ICTR).  
For comparison of the Department of Defense rules for military commissions
that were struck down in Hamdan to recent legislative proposals, see CRS Report
RL31600, The Department of Defense Rules for Military Commissions: Analysis of
Procedural Rules and Comparison with Proposed Legislation and the Uniform Code
of Military Justice.
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1 Military Order, November 13, 2001 Detention, Treatment, and Trial of Certain Non-
Citizens in the War Against Terrorism §1(a), 66 Fed. Reg. 57,833 (Nov. 16, 2001).
2 10 U.S.C. § 801 et seq.
3  Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. __ (2006), rev’g 415 F.3d  33 (D.C. Cir. 2005).  The Geneva
Conventions were held to be incorporated by implication into the UCMJ.  For an analysis
of the decision, see CRS Report RS22466,  Hamdan v. Rumsfeld: Military Commissions in
the ‘Global War on Terrorism,’ by Jennifer K. Elsea.  
Selected Procedural Safeguards in Federal,
Military, and International Courts
Declaring it necessary to bring to justice those responsible for the terrorist
attacks on the United States of September 11, 2001, President Bush signed a Military
Order (M.O.) authorizing the trial by military commission of certain non-citizens.1
The order directed the Secretary of Defense to establish the procedural rules for the
operation of the military commissions convened pursuant to the M.O. The
Department of Defense implemented regulations and convened commissions;
however, one of the accused petitioned for habeas corpus in federal district court and
the Supreme Court invalidated the regulations as inconsistent with the Uniform Code
of Military Justice (UCMJ2) and the Geneva Conventions.3  
This report provides a brief overview of procedural rules applicable in selected
historical and contemporary tribunals for the trials of war crimes suspects.  The chart
that follows compares selected procedural safeguards employed in criminal trials in
federal criminal court with parallel protective measures in military general courts-
martial, international military tribunals used after World War II, including the
International Military Tribunal (IMT or “Nuremberg Tribunal”), and the International
Criminal Courts for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and Rwanda (ICTR).  The chart
identifies a selection of basic rights in rough order of the stage in the criminal justice
process where they might become most important.  The text of the chart indicates
some of the procedural safeguards designed to protect  these rights in different
tribunals.  Recognizing that fundamental fairness relies on the system of procedural
safeguards as a whole rather than individual rules, the chart is intended only as an
outline to compare some of the rules different courts and tribunals might use to
safeguard certain rights. 
U.S. Courts and Military Tribunals
 The Constitution imposes on the government a system of restraints to provide
that no unfair law is enforced and that no law is enforced unfairly.  What is
fundamentally fair in a given situation depends in part on the objectives of a given
system of law weighed alongside the possible infringement of individual liberties that
CRS-2
4 Wong Wing v. United States, 163 U.S. 228 (1896)(aliens are entitled to due process of
law).
5 U.S. CONST. Art. VI (“[A]ll Treaties ... shall be the Supreme Law of the Land; ...”).
6 See, e.g. 18 U.S.C. § 2441 (War Crimes Act).
7 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS § 111 (1987).
8 For a brief explanation of the sources of the law of war, see generally CRS Report
RL31191, Terrorism and the Law of War: Trying Terrorists as War Criminals before
Military Commissions, by Jennifer Elsea.
system might impose.  In the criminal law system, some basic objectives are to
discover the truth, punish the guilty proportionately with their crimes, acquit the
innocent without unnecessary delay or expense, and prevent and deter further crime,
thereby providing for the public order.  Military justice shares these objectives in
part, but also serves to enhance discipline throughout the armed forces, serving the
overall objective of providing an effective national defense.  The equation for
international criminal law may also consider foreign policy elements as well as
international law and treaty obligations.
The Fifth Amendment to the Constitution provides that “no person shall be ...
deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.” Due process
includes the opportunity to be heard whenever the government places any of these
fundamental liberties at stake.  The Constitution contains other explicit rights
applicable to various stages of a criminal prosecution.  Criminal proceedings provide
both the opportunity to contest guilt and to challenge the government’s conduct that
may have violated the rights of the accused.  The system of procedural rules used to
conduct a criminal hearing, therefore, serves as a safeguard against violations of
constitutional rights that take place outside the courtroom.
The Bill of Rights applies to all citizens of the United States and all aliens
within the United States.4 However, the methods of application of constitutional
rights, in particular the remedies available to those whose rights might have been
violated, may differ depending on the severity of the punitive measure the
government seeks to take and the entity deciding the case.  The jurisdiction of various
entities to try a person accused of a crime could have a profound effect on the
procedural rights of the accused.  The type of judicial review available also varies
and may be crucial to the outcome.
International law also contains some basic guarantees of human rights, including
rights of criminal defendants and prisoners. Treaties to which the United States is a
party are expressly made a part of the law of the land by the Supremacy Clause of the
Constitution,5 and may be codified through implementing legislation.6  International
law is incorporated into U.S. law.7 The law of war, a subset of international law,
applies to cases arising from armed conflicts (i.e., war crimes).8  It is unclear exactly
how the law of war applies to the current hostilities involving  non-state terrorists,
and the nature of the rights due to accused terrorist/war criminals may depend in part
on their status under the Geneva Conventions.  The Supreme Court has ruled that Al
Qaeda fighters are entitled at least to the baseline protections applicable under
CRS-3
9 Hamdan, slip op. at 67 (citing art. 3 § 1(d) of The Geneva Convention Relative to the
Treatment of Prisoners of War, August 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3317).  The identical provision
is included in each of the four Geneva Conventions and applies to any “conflict not of an
international character.”  The majority declined to accept the President’s interpretation of
Common Article 3 as inapplicable to the conflict with al Qaeda and interpreted the phrase
“in contradistinction to a conflict between nations,” which the Geneva Conventions
designate a “conflict of international character.”  
10 U.S. CONST. Preamble.
11  Id. art. I § 8, cls. 11-14 (War Power).
12  Id. art. II § 2, cl. 1.
13  Id. art. I § 8, cl. 14.
14  See Dynes v. Hoover, 61 U.S. (How.) 65 (1857).
15  See WILLIAM WINTHROP, WINTHROP’S MILITARY LAW AND PRECEDENTS 48-49 (2d. ed.
1920)(describing courts-martial as instrumentalities of the executive power, provided by
Congress for the President as Commander-in-chief, to aid him in properly commanding the
army and navy and enforcing discipline therein) (emphasis in original).
Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions,9 which includes protection from the
“passing of sentences and the carrying out of executions without previous judgment
pronounced by a regularly constituted court, affording all the judicial guarantees
which are recognized as indispensable by civilized peoples.”
Federal Court.  The federal judiciary is established by Article III of the
Constitution and consists of the Supreme Court and “inferior tribunals” established
by Congress.  It is a separate and co-equal branch of the federal government,
independent of the executive and legislative branches, designed to be insulated from
the public passions.  Its function is not to make law but to interpret law and decide
disputes arising under it.  Federal criminal law and procedures are enacted by
Congress and housed primarily in title 18 of the U.S. Code. The Supreme Court
promulgates procedural rules for criminal trials at the federal district courts, subject
to Congress’s approval.  These rules, namely the Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure (Fed. R. Crim. P.)  and the Federal Rules of Evidence (Fed. R. Evid.),
incorporate procedural rights that the Constitution and various statutes demand.  The
chart cites relevant rules or court decisions, but makes no effort to provide an
exhaustive list of authorities.
General Courts-Martial.  The Constitution, in order to provide for the
common defense,10 gives Congress the power to raise, support, and regulate the
armed forces,11 but makes the President Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces.12
Article III does not give the judiciary any explicit role in the military, and the
Supreme Court has taken the view that Congress’ power “[t]o Make Rules for the
Government and Regulation of the land and naval Forces”13 is entirely separate from
Article III.14  Therefore, courts-martial are not considered to be Article III courts and
are not subject to all of the rules that apply in federal courts.15
Although military personnel are “persons” to whom the Bill of Rights applies,
in the military context it might be said that discipline is as important as liberty as
CRS-4
16  See Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2 (1866).  Congress has, in article 32, UCMJ,
provided for a pre-trial hearing that performs the same basic function as a grand jury.  Court-
martial panels consist of a military judge and several panel members, who function similarly
to a jury.
17 For an overview of the court-martial process, see CRS Report RS21850,  Military
Courts-Martial: An Overview, by Jennifer K. Elsea.
18  See 10 U.S.C. § 802. “In time of war” refers to war declared by Congress. United States
v. Averette, 17 USCMA 363 (1968).
19  See 10 U.S.C. § 818.
20  10 U.S.C. § 836.  Article 36 authorizes the President to prescribe rules for “pretrial, trial,
and post-trial procedures, including modes of proof, for cases arising under this chapter
triable in courts-martial, military commissions and other military tribunals.” Such rules are
to “apply the principles of law and the rules of evidence generally recognized in the trial of
criminal cases in the United States district courts” insofar as the President “considers
practicable” but that “may not be contrary to or inconsistent” with the UCMJ.   
21  The rules are set forth in the Manual for Courts-Martial (M.C.M.), established as Exec.
Order No. 12473, Manual for Courts-Martial, United States, 49 Fed. Reg 17,152, (Apr. 23,
1984), as amended.
objectives of military justice.  Also, the Constitution specifically exempts  military
members accused of a crime from the Fifth Amendment right to a grand jury
indictment, from which the Supreme Court has inferred there is no right to a civil
jury in courts-martial.16   However, in part because of the different standards provided
in courts-martial, their jurisdiction is limited to those persons and offenses the
military has a legitimate interest in regulating.17  Courts-martial jurisdiction extends
mainly to service members on active duty, prisoners of war, and persons
accompanying the armed forces in time of declared war,18 as well as certain violators
of the law of war.19 
 Congress regulates the armed forces largely through title 10 of the U.S. Code,
which contains as Chapter 47 the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ)
regulating the system of military courts-martial.  The Supreme Court has found the
procedures Congress set through the UCMJ to provide adequate procedural
safeguards to satisfy constitutional requirements and the interest in maintaining a
strong national defense.  
Congress has delegated to the President the authority to make procedural rules
for the military justice system.20  The President created the Rules for Courts-Martial
(R.C.M.) and the Military Rules of Evidence (Mil. R. Evid.) pursuant to that
delegation.21  The comparison chart will cite provisions of the UCMJ and the
applicable rules, as well as military appellate court opinions as applicable.
Defendants are not able to appeal their courts-martial directly to federal courts,
but may seek relief in the form of a writ of habeas corpus, although review may be
limited.  However, Congress has provided for a separate system of reviewing
convictions by court-martial, which includes a civilian appellate court. In cases in
which the convening authority approves a sentence of death, or, unless the defendant
waives review, approves a bad-conduct discharge, a dishonorable discharge,
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22 There are four such courts — the Army Court of Criminal Appeals, the Navy-Marine
Corps Court of Criminal Appeals, the Air Force Court of Criminal Appeals, and the Coast
Guard Court of Criminal Appeals.  These courts are established by the Judge Advocate
General of the respective service.  10 U.S.C. § 866.
23   U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 11.
24   Id. art. I, § 8, cl. 10.
25   Id. art. I, § 8, cl. 14.
26   Id. art. II.
27   The Articles of War were re-enacted at 10 U.S.C. § 801 et seq. as part of the UCMJ.
Although there is no case law interpreting the UCMJ as authorizing military commissions,
the relevant sections of the UCMJ, which recognize the concurrent jurisdiction of military
commissions to deal with “offenders or offenses designated by statute or the law of war,”
are essentially identical to the corresponding language in the Articles of War. See 10 U.S.C.
§ 821.
28   Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1 (1942).
29 See WINTHROP, supra note 15, at 831 (describing distinction between courts-martial and
military tribunals).
30  10 U.S.C. § 821.  Statutory offenses for which military commissions may be convened
(continued...)
dismissal of an officer, or confinement for one year or more, the Court of Criminal
Appeals for the appropriate service22 must review the case for legal error, factual
sufficiency, and appropriateness of the sentence.   
The Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces (CAAF) exercises appellate
jurisdiction over the services’ Courts of Criminal Appeals, with respect to issues of
law.  The CAAF is an Article I court composed of five civilian judges appointed for
15-year terms by the President with the advice and consent of the Senate. Its
jurisdiction is established in Article 67 of the UCMJ (10 U.S.C. § 867), and is
discretionary except in death penalty cases.
Military Commissions.  The Constitution empowers the Congress to declare
war and “make rules concerning captures on land and water,”23 to define and punish
violations of the “Law of Nations,”24 and to make regulations to govern the armed
forces.25  The power of the President to convene military commissions flows from his
authority as Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces and his responsibility to
execute the laws of the nation.26 Under the  Articles of War and subsequent statute,27
the President has at least implicit authority to convene military commissions to try
offenses against the law of war.28  There is, therefore, somewhat of a distinction
between the authority and objectives behind convening military courts-martial and
commissions.29  Rather than serving the internally directed purpose of maintaining
discipline and order of the troops, the military commission is externally directed at
the enemy as a means of waging successful war by punishing and deterring offenses
against the law of war.
Jurisdiction of military commissions is limited to time of war and to trying
offenses recognized under the law of war or as designated by statute.30 While case
CRS-6
30 (...continued)
are limited to aiding the enemy, 10 U.S.C. § 904, and spying, 10 U.S.C. § 906.
31   See Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1 (1942).
32  See Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. at 38; Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2, 123 (1866)
(noting a servicemember “surrenders his right to be tried by the civil courts”).  
33   10 U.S.C. §  836. The Supreme Court has held that the President’s discretion to
determine whether the application of procedural rules that apply in federal courts is not
without limitation.  Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. __ (2006).
34  Id.
35 Id.
36 For more information about the history of military commissions in the United States, see
CRS Report RL31191, Terrorism and the Law of War: Trying Terrorists as War Criminals
before Military Commissions, by Jennifer K. Elsea; CRS Report RL32458, Military
Tribunals: Historical Patterns and Lessons, by Louis Fisher; CRS Report RL31340:
Military Tribunals: The Quirin Precedent, by Louis Fisher.
law suggests that military commissions could try U.S. citizens as enemy
belligerents,31 the Military Order of November 13, 2001 limits their jurisdiction to
non-citizens.
As non-Article III courts, military commissions are not subject to the same
constitutional requirements that are applied in Article III courts.32 Congress has
delegated to the President the authority to set the rules of procedure and evidence for
military tribunals, applying “the principles of law and the rules of evidence generally
recognized in the trial of criminal cases in the United States district court” insofar as
he considers it practicable.33 The rules “may not be contrary to or inconsistent with
the UCMJ”34 and must be uniform insofar as practicable with courts-martial.35
 The United States  first  used  military commissions to try enemy belligerents
accused of war crimes during the occupation of Mexico in 1847, and made heavy use
of them in the Civil War.36  However, prior to the President’s Military Order, no
military commissions had been convened since the aftermath of World War II.
Because of the lack of standards of procedure used by military commissions, it is
difficult to draw a meaningful comparison with the other types of tribunals.  For a
comparison of the Department of Defense rules for military commissions that were
struck down in Hamdan to recent legislative proposals, see CRS Report RL31600,
The Department of Defense Rules for Military Commissions: Analysis of Procedural
Rules and Comparison with Proposed Legislation and the Uniform Code of Military
Justice.
International War Crimes Tribunals
Prior to the twentieth century, war crimes were generally tried, if tried at all, by
belligerent States in their own national courts or special military tribunals.  After
World War I, the Allies appointed a 15-member commission to inquire into the legal
liability of those responsible for the war and the numerous breaches of the law of war
that it occasioned.  It recommended the establishment of an international military
CRS-7
37 See id. at 46.
38 See id. at 49.
39 See id. at 51-52.
40 See Agreement for the Prosecution and Punishment of the Major War Criminals of the
European Axis Powers and Charter of the International Military Tribunal, Aug. 8, 1945, 82
U.N.T.S. 279 [hereinafter “London Charter”], available at [http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/
avalon/imt/proc/imtconst.htm].  The Rules of Procedure (IMT Rules) are available at
[http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/imt/proc/imtrules.htm].
41 Approximately 185 people were indicted. Thirty people were sentenced to death, one
hundred twenty were given prison sentences, and thirty-five were acquitted.
42 See Evan J. Wallach, The Procedural And Evidentiary Rules of the Post-World War II
War Crimes Trials: Did They Provide An Outline For International Legal Procedure?, 37
COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 851, 860 (1999).
43  See id. at 871-72.
44 See KRIANGSAK KITTICHAISAREE, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 20 (2001).
45   See, Wallach, supra note 42, at 852 (citing VIRGINIA MORRIS & MICHAEL SCHARF, 1 AN
INSIDER’S GUIDE TO THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL FOR THE FORMER
YUGOSLAVIA 9-10 (1995)).
tribunal to prosecute those accused of war crimes and crimes against humanity.  After
Germany refused to comply with the locally unpopular provision of the peace treaty
requiring it to turn over accused war criminals to the Allied forces for trial, a
compromise was reached in which Germany agreed to prosecute those persons in its
national courts.37  Of 901 cases referred to the German Supreme Court for trial at
Leipzig, only 13 were convicted.38  Because German nationalism appeared to have
hindered the earnest prosecution of war criminals, the results were largely seen as a
failure.39
International Military Tribunals.  In the aftermath of World War II, the
Allies applied lessons learned at Leipzig and formed special international tribunals
for the European and Asian theaters.  In an agreement concluded in London on
August 8, 1945, the United States, France, Great Britain and the Soviet Union
together established the International Military Tribunal (IMT) at Nuremberg for the
trial of war criminals.40 The four occupying powers also established Control Council
Law No. 10, authorizing military tribunals at the national level to try the less high-
profile war crimes and crimes against humanity.41  
The evidentiary rules used at Nuremberg and adopted by the Tokyo tribunals
were designed to be non-technical, allowing the expeditious admission of “all
evidence [the Tribunal] deems to have probative value.”42  This evidence included
hearsay, coerced confessions, and the findings of prior mass trials.43  It has also been
argued that the tribunals violated the principles of legality by establishing ex post
facto crimes and dispensing victor’s justice.44  However, while the historical
consensus seems to have accepted that the Nuremberg Trials were conducted fairly,45
some observers argue that the malleability of the rules of procedure and evidence
could and did have some unjust results, in particular as they were applied by the
CRS-8
46   See id. at 869; Application of Homma, 327 U.S. 759, 760 (1946) (Murphy, J. dissenting).
But see Jonathan A. Bush, Lex Americana: Constitutional Due Process and the Nuremberg
Defendants, 45 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 515, 526 (2001)(arguing that in many ways, “the new
[Tokyo and Nuremberg] tribunals’ charters gave defendants many rights that went beyond
anything allowed in the American system” at the time of the trials).
47   Justice Murphy wrote:
 [The rules], as will be noted, permit[] reception of documents, reports, affidavits,
depositions, diaries, letters, copies of documents or other secondary evidence of
their contents, hearsay, opinion evidence and conclusions, in fact of anything
which in the commission’s opinion “would be of assistance in proving or
disproving the charge,” without any of the usual modes of authentication.  A
more complete abrogation of customary safeguards relating to the proof, whether
in the usual rules of evidence or any reasonable substitute and whether for use
in the trial of crime in the civil courts or military tribunals, hardly could have
been made.  So far as the admissibility and probative value of evidence was
concerned, the directive made the commission a law unto itself.
In re Yamashita, 327 U.S. at 49 (Murphy, J. dissenting).
48 See Wallach, supra note 42.
49 See Matthew Lippman, Crimes Against Humanity, 17 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 171, 238
(1997).
50 See KITTICHAISAREE,supra note 44, at 18 (citing the judgment of the tribunal in the
context of “crimes against peace” to the effect that justice required, rather than prohibited,
the punishment of those responsible for unprovoked attacks against neighboring states “in
defiance of treaties and assurances”).
national military tribunals.46  The Tokyo tribunal decisions were subject to criticism
by dissenters on the Supreme Court in the Yamashita case.47 Some argue that
procedural safeguards considered sufficient for the World War II tribunals would not
likely meet today’s standards of justice.48
Nuremberg.  The jurisdiction of the Nuremberg Tribunal was based on
universally applicable international law regulating armed conflict, and its authority
was based on the combined sovereignty of the Allies and Germany’s unconditional
surrender.49   The Tribunal rejected the defendants’ contention that the tribunal
violated fundamental legal principles by trying them for conduct that was not
prohibited by criminal law at the time it was committed.50  The Nuremberg Tribunal
also adopted the doctrine of individual responsibility for war crimes, rejecting the
idea that state sovereignty could protect those responsible from punishment for their
misdeeds.  
Twenty-four Nazi leaders were indicted and tried as war criminals by the
International Military Tribunal (IMT). The indictments contained four counts: (1)
crimes against the peace, (2) crimes against humanity, (3) war crimes, and (4) a
common plan or conspiracy to commit the aforementioned acts.  Nineteen of the
defendants were found guilty, three were acquitted, one committed suicide before the
sentence, and one was physically and mentally unfit for trial. Sentences ranged from
CRS-9
51 Charter of the International Military Tribunal For The Far East, Apr. 26, 1946 (“IMTFE
Charter”), T.I.A.S. No. 1589, available at [http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/imtfech.
htm].
52 UN Doc. S/Res/808 (1993; UN Doc. S/Res/827 (1993). Its statute (ICTY Stat.) and
procedural rules (ICTY Rule) are available at [http://www.un.org/icty/legaldoc-e/
index.htm].  For more information, see CRS Report RL30864, Yugoslavia War Crimes
Tribunal: Current Issues for Congress, by Julie Kim.
53 UN Doc. S/Res/955 (1994). Its statute (ICTR Stat.) and procedural rules (ICTR Rule) are
available at [http://69.94.11.53/default.htm].
death by hanging (twelve), life imprisonment (three), and imprisonment for ten to
twenty years (four).
Tokyo. The International Military Tribunal for the Far East (IMTFE) in Tokyo
was established by a Special Proclamation of General Douglas MacArthur as the
Supreme Commander in the Far East for the Allied Powers.51  Many provisions of the
IMTFE were adapted from the London Agreement. The Tokyo tribunal tried only the
most serious crimes, crimes against peace.  General MacArthur appointed eleven
judges, one from each of the victorious Allied nations who signed the instrument of
surrender and one each from India and the Philippines, to sit on the tribunal.  General
MacArthur also appointed the prosecutor.  Of  the twenty-five people indicted for
crimes against peace, all were convicted, with seven executed, sixteen given life
imprisonment, and two others serving lesser terms.  Some 300,000 Japanese
nationals were tried for conventional war crimes (primarily prisoner abuse) and
crimes against humanity in national military tribunals.
Ad Hoc International Courts.  The U.N. Security Council (UNSC), acting
under its Chapter VII authority of the U.N. Charter, established two ad hoc criminal
courts, the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY)52 and
the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR).53 Both tribunals are still
operating, and employ virtually identical procedural rules.  Their jurisdiction is
coexistent with that of national courts, but they also may assert primacy over national
courts to prevent trials of the same individuals in more than one forum.  Their
jurisprudence may provide important precedent for the interpretation of Common
Article 3.
Yugoslavia.  Based in the Hague, Netherlands, the ICTY has jurisdiction to
try crimes conducted within the territory of the former Yugoslavia, including the
crime of “ethnic cleansing,” whether committed in the context of an international war
or a war of non-international character.  It tries violations of the Geneva Conventions
of 1949, violations of the laws or customs of war, genocide, and crimes against
humanity when committed in the context of an armed conflict. It is composed of
sixteen permanent independent judges, who are elected by the UN General Assembly
from a list of nominations provided by the Security Council.  It has an Appeals
Chamber consisting of seven judges, five of whom sit on a panel in any given case.
The Prosecutor, an independent organ of the court appointed by the UN Security
Council on the recommendation of the UN Secretary-General, investigates and
prosecutes those responsible for covered offenses.  When the Prosecutor finds that
CRS-10
54 See [http://69.94.11.53/ENGLISH/factsheets/achievements.htm].
55 See [http://69.94.11.53/ENGLISH/factsheets/detainee.htm].  More information is available
at the ICTY website, [http://www.un.org/icty/].
sufficient evidence exists to try an individual, he issues an indictment, subject to the
approval of a judge from the Trial Chamber.  
Rwanda.  The ICTR, based in Arusha, Tanzania, was established by the UN
Security Council in response to genocide and other systematic, widespread, and
flagrant violations of humanitarian law applicable in the context of a non-
international armed conflict, that is, Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions
and Additional Protocol II, genocide, and crimes against humanity.  Its structure and
composition are similar to those of the ICTY. As of June 2006, the ICTR has tried
28 accused, convicting 25 and acquitting three.54  Twenty-seven defendants are
undergoing trial, and another fourteen await trial.55
CRS-11
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432, 453 (1895). 
If the defendant fails to enter a
proper plea, a plea of not guilty
will be entered. Fed. R. Crim.
P. 11(a).
Defendant is entitled to jury
instructions explaining that
guilt must be proved on the
evidence beyond a reasonable
doubt. Taylor v. Kentucky, 436
U.S. 478 (1978).
Defendant is entitled to appear
in court without unnecessary
physical restraints or other
indicia of guilt, such as
appearing in prison uniform,
that may be prejudicial to jury.
See Holbrook v. Flynn, 475
U.S. 560 (1986).
If the defendant fails to enter a
proper plea, a plea of not guilty
will be entered. R.C.M. 910(b).
 Members of court martial
must be instructed that the
“accused must be presumed to
be innocent until the accused’s
guilt is established by legal and
competent evidence beyond a
reasonable doubt.” 
R.C.M. 920(e).
The accused shall be properly
attired in uniform with grade
insignia and any decorations to
which entitled.  Physical
restraint shall not be imposed
unless prescribed by the
military judge.
R.C.M. 804.
No written rule addressing
presumption of innocence,
although U.S. negotiators were
able to win a concession from
Soviet negotiators to the effect
that the rule would apply.  See
Henry T. King, Jr., Robert
Jackson’s Transcendent
Influence Over Today’s World,
68 ALB. L. REV. 23, 25 (2006).
“The accused shall be
presumed innocent until proved
guilty according to the
provisions of the present
Statute.”
ICTY Stat. art. 21(3); ICTR
Stat. art. 20.
If the accused fails to enter a
plea, the court must enter a plea
of not guilty on the accused’s
behalf.
ICTY Rule 62(a)(iv); ICTR
Rule 62(a)(iii).
Instruments of restraint may
not be used during court
proceedings.
ICTY Rule 83; ICTR Rule 83.
Guilty pleas may be accepted
only if the trial chamber
CRS-12
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determines it is voluntary,
informed, unequivocal, and
supported by evidence.





be compelled in any




 Incriminating statements made
by defendant under duress or
without prior Miranda warning
are inadmissible as evidence of
guilt in a criminal trial.
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S.
436 (1966).
Before a jury is allowed to hear
evidence of a defendant’s
confession, the court must
determine that it was
voluntarily given.
18 U.S.C. § 3501.
Coerced confessions or
confessions made without
statutory equivalent of Miranda
warning are not admissible as
evidence.  Art. 31, UCMJ, 10
U.S.C. § 831.
The prosecutor must notify the
defense of any incriminating
statements made by the
accused that are relevant to the
case prior to the arraignment. 
Motions to suppress such
statements must be made prior
to pleading.
Mil. R. Evid. 304.
No right to remain silent. The
Tokyo rules specifically
provided that “all purported
admissions or statements of the
accused are admissible.”
IMTFE Charter art 13.
A suspect to be questioned by
the prosecutor during an
investigation must be informed
of his right to remain silent.
ICTY Rule 42; ICTR Rule 42.
Persons are to be informed of
the right to remain silent upon
their arrest.
ICTY Rule 55; ICTR Rule 55.
“No evidence shall be
admissible if obtained by
methods which cast substantial
doubt on its reliability or if its
admission is antithetical to, and
would seriously damage, the
integrity of the proceedings.”
ICTY Rule 95; ICTR Rule 95.
CRS-13
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“The right of the













seizures may be excluded in
court.  Boyd v. United States,
116 U.S. 616 (1886); Nardone
v. United States, 308 U.S. 338
(1938); Fed. R. Crim. P. 41.
A search warrant issued by a
magistrate on a showing of
probable cause is generally
required for law enforcement
agents to conduct a search of
an area  where the subject has a
reasonable expectation of
privacy, including searches and
seizures of telephone or other
communications and emissions
of heat and other phenomena
detectable with means other
than human senses.  Katz v.
United States, 389 U.S. 347
(1967).
“Evidence obtained as a result
of an unlawful search or
seizure ... is inadmissible
against the accused ...” unless
certain exceptions apply.  
Mil. R. Evid. 311.
“Authorization to search” may
be oral or written, and may be
issued by a military judge or an
officer in command of the area
to be searched, or if the area is
not under military control, with
authority over persons subject
to military law or the law of
war.  It must be based on
probable cause. 
Mil. R. Evid. 315.
Interception of wire and oral
communications within the
United States requires judicial
application in accordance with
18 U.S.C. §§ 2516 et seq.
Not provided.  “No evidence shall be
admissible if ... its admission is
antithetical to, and would
seriously damage, the integrity
of the proceedings.”
ICTY Rule 95; ICTR Rule 95.
CRS-14
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Evidence resulting from
overseas searches of American
property by foreign officials is
admissible unless  foreign
police conduct shocks judicial
conscience or participation by
U.S. agents is so substantial as
to render the action that of the
United States.  United States v.
Barona, 56 F.3d 1087 (9th Cir.
1995).
Mil. R. Evid. 317.
A search conducted by foreign
officials is unlawful only if the
accused is subject to “gross and
brutal treatment.”  










Defendants in criminal cases
have the right to representation
by an attorney at all stages of
prosecution.  The defendant
may hire an attorney or, if 
indigent, have counsel
appointed at the government’s
expense.  If two or more co-
defendants are represented by
one attorney, the court must
inquire as to whether a conflict
The defendant has a right to
military counsel at government
expense.  The defendant may
choose counsel, if that attorney
is reasonably available, and
may hire a civilian attorney in
addition to military counsel.  
Art 38, UCMJ, 10 U.S.C.
§ 838.
Appointed counsel must be
“Each defendant has the right
to conduct his own defense or
to have the assistance of
counsel,” and was required to
be told of that right. Only one
counsel was permitted to
appear at the trial for any
defendant, unless the IMT
granted special permission.
The IMT was to designate
counsel for any defendant who
Prior to being charged, “[i]f
questioned, the suspect shall be
entitled to be assisted by
counsel of his own choice,
including the right to have
legal assistance assigned to him
without payment by him in any
such case if he does not have
sufficient means to pay for it,
as well as to necessary
translation into and from a
CRS-15
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Amendment VI. of interest exists.  
Fed. R. Crim. P. 44.
 Conversations between
attorneys and clients are
privileged.  Fed. R. Evid. 501.
Procedures for ensuring
adequate representation of
defendants are outlined at 18
U.S.C. §§ 3005 (capital cases)
and 3006A.
certified as qualified and may
not be someone who has taken
any part in the  investigation or
prosecution, unless explicitly
requested by the defendant. 
Art. 27, UCMJ, 10 U.S.C.
§ 827.
The attorney-client privilege is
honored.  Mil. R. Evid. 502.
failed to apply for particular
counsel or if the counsel
requested was not available,
unless the defendant elected in
writing to conduct his own
defense.  IMT Rule 2.
The IMTFE Charter provided
that “[e]ach accused shall have
the right to be represented by
counsel of his own selection,
subject to the disapproval of
such counsel at any time by the
Tribunal. ... If an accused is not
represented by counsel and in
open court requests the
appointment of counsel, the
Tribunal shall designate
counsel for him. In the absence
of such request the Tribunal
may appoint counsel for an
accused if in its judgment such
appointment is necessary to
provide for a fair trial.”
language he speaks and
understands.” ICTY Stat. art.
18; ICTR Stat. art. 17.
The accused has the right “to
communicate with counsel of
his own choosing ...  and to
defend himself in person or
through legal assistance of his
own choosing; to be informed,
if he does not have legal
assistance, of this right; and to
have legal assistance assigned
to him, in any case where the
interests of justice so require,
and without payment by him in
any such case if he does not
have sufficient means to pay
for it.”  ICTY Stat. art. 21;
ICTR Stat. art. 20.
All communications between
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IMTFE Charter art. 9(c). cannot be ordered unless the
client or has waived the
privilege by voluntarily
disclosing the content of the
communication to a third party.
ICTY Rule 97; ICTR Rule 97.
Qualifications for counsel and
assignment of counsel to
indigent defendants are set





 “No person shall be







Where the accused is in danger
of being subjected to an
infamous punishment if
convicted, he has the right to
insist that he shall not be tried
except on the accusation of a
grand jury.  Ex parte Wilson,
114 U.S. 417 (1885); Fed. R.
Crim. P. 7.
Jurors must be selected from a
fair cross section of the
The right to indictment by
grand jury is explicitly
excluded in “cases arising in
the land or naval forces.”
Amendment V.
Whenever an offense is
alleged, the commander is
responsible for initiating a
preliminary inquiry and
deciding how to dispose of the
offense. R.C.M. 303-06.
“Each individual defendant in
custody shall receive not less
than 30 days before trial a
copy, translated into a language
which he understands, (1) of
the Indictment, (2) of the
Charter, (3) of any other
documents lodged with the
Indictment….”  IMT Rule 2.
The Tokyo Tribunal required
the same documents to be
provided not less than 14 days
The prosecutor, if satisfied that
there is sufficient evidence to
provide reasonable grounds for
believing that a suspect has
committed a crime within the
jurisdiction of the ICTY (or
ICTR), prepares an indictment
for confirmation by a Judge,
setting forth the name and
particulars of the suspect, and a
concise statement of the facts
of the case and of the crime
CRS-17
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in cases arising in
the land or naval
forces, or in the
Militia, when in
actual service in




accused can challenge the
indictment. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1861
et seq.
Once an indictment is given, its
scope may not be increased. 
Ex parte Bain, 121 U.S. 1
(1887).
(Amendments to an indictment
must undergo further grand
jury process.)
before trial.  IMTFE Rule 1. with which the suspect is
charged.  ICTY Stat. arts.
18-19 and ICTY Rule 47;
ICTR Stat. arts. 17-18; ICTR
Rule 47.
A person against whom an
indictment has been confirmed
is to be taken into custody and
immediately informed of the
charges in a language he
understands.  ICTY Stat. arts.
20-21 and Rule 47; ICTR Stat.
arts. 19-20 and ICTR Rule 47.
The prosecutor may amend the
indictment as prescribed in





Defendant is entitled to be
informed of the nature of the
charge with sufficiently
reasonable certainty to allow
Charges and specifications
must be signed under oath and
made known to the accused as
soon as practicable. Art. 30,
See above. An arrested person must be
completely informed of
charges, which may be satisfied
by presentation to the accused
CRS-18
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nature and cause of
the accusation; …”
Amendment VI. 
for preparation of defense. 
Cook v. United States, 138
U.S. 157 (1891).
UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. § 830. of a copy of the written
charges, translated, if
necessary.
ICTY Rule 59 bis. 
At the ICTR, the registrar is
required to prepare certified
copies of the indictment in a
language the accused
understands, but there does not
appear to be a requirement that
the accused be furnished with a
written copy.  ICTR Rule 47.






accused’s right to be
present in the
courtroom at every
The language, history, and
logic of Rule 43 support a
straightforward interpretation
that prohibits the trial in
absentia of a defendant who is
not present at the beginning of
trial.  Crosby v. United States,
506 U.S. 255, 262 (1993); Fed.
R. Crim. P. 43. 
The presence of the accused is
required during arraignment, at
the plea, and at every stage of
the court-martial unless the
accused waives the right by
voluntarily absenting him or
herself from the proceedings
after the arraignment or by
persisting in conduct that
justifies the trial judge in
Not provided. “The Tribunal
shall have the right to take
proceedings against a person
charged … in his absence, if he
has not been found or if the
Tribunal, for any reason, finds
it necessary, in the interests of
justice, to conduct the hearing
in his absence.”  IMT Charter
art. 12.
The accused has the right “to
be tried in his presence.”
ICTY Stat. art. 21; ICTR Stat.
art. 20.
In absentia trials are permitted
only in cases of exceptional
contempt of court, where the
accused voluntarily absents
himself from the proceeding. 
CRS-19
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absents himself from court
during trial, court may
“proceed with trial in like
manner and with like effect as
if he were present.”
Diaz v. United States, 223 U.S.
442, 455 (1912).
ordering the removal of the
accused from the proceedings.
R.C.M. 801.
(Martin Bormann, who was
never located and was rumored
to be dead, was convicted in
absentia and sentenced to
death.)
The Tokyo rules provided that
“Any accused or any other
person may be excluded from
open session of the Tribunal
for failure to observe and
respect the directives or dignity
of the Tribunal.”  IMTFE Rule
3.
Prosecutor v. Blaskic, Case
No. IT-95-14-AR 108 bis,
Decision on Subpoena, ICTY




 “No ... ex post facto
law shall be
passed.”
Art. I, § 9, cl. 3. 
Congress may not pass a law
punishing conduct that was not
a crime when perpetrated,
increasing the possible
sentence for a crime, or
reducing the government’s
evidentiary burden.  Calder v.
Bull, 3 Dall. (3 U.S.) 386
(1798); Ex Parte Garland, 4
Wall (71 U.S.) 1867.
Courts-martial will not enforce
an ex post facto law, including
increasing amount of pay to be
forfeited for specific crimes.
U.S. v. Gorki, 47 M.J. 370
(1997).
Not provided.  Article 6 of the
IMT Charter provided for
jurisdiction to try not only war
crimes, but also “crimes
against peace” and “crimes
against humanity,” which had
never before been defined as
international crimes.  The IMT
rejected defenses based on the
ex post facto nature of the
Jurisdiction is limited to
specified crimes.
ICTY Stat. arts. 2-5 (grave
breaches of the Geneva
Conventions, violations of the
laws or customs of war,
genocide, and crimes against
humanity).  
ICTR jurisdiction is limited to
CRS-20
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charges, remarking that the rule
against such charges “is not a
limitation of sovereignty, but is
in general a principle of
justice.”  The IMT went on to
conclude that justice does not
prohibit, but rather requires the
punishment of “those who in
defiance of treaties and
assurances have attacked
neighbouring states without
warning.”  IMT Opinion and
Judgment:  The Law of the
Charter.
The statute for the Tokyo
Tribunal provided it
jurisdiction over the specific
violations “whether or not in
violation of the domestic law




humanity, and violations of
Article 3 Common to the
Geneva Conventions and of
Additional Protocol II.
ICTR Stat. arts. 1-4.
CRS-21
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Protection against
Double Jeopardy 
“… nor shall any
person be subject
for the same offence
to be twice put in












 Jeopardy attaches once the
jury is sworn or where there is
no jury, when the first evidence
is presented.  If the trial is
terminated after jeopardy has
attached, a second trial may be
barred in a court under the
same sovereign, particularly
where it is prosecutorial
conduct  that brings about the
termination of the trial. 
Illinois v. Somerville, 410 U.S.
458 (1973).
Double jeopardy clause
applies.  See Wade v. Hunter,
336 US 684, 688-89 (1949). 
Art. 44, UCMJ prohibits
double jeopardy, provides for
jeopardy to attach after
introduction of evidence.
10 U.S.C. § 844.
General court-martial
proceeding is considered to be
a federal trial for double
jeopardy purposes.  Double
jeopardy does not result from
charges brought in state or
foreign courts, although court-
martial in such cases is
disfavored. United States v.
Stokes, 12 M.J. 229 (C.M.A.
1982).
Once military authorities have
turned service member over to
civil authorities for trial,
Not provided.  Jurisdiction was
concurrent with national
courts, but the IMT could only
try serious crimes not limited
to a specific geographical
location.
“No person shall be tried
before a national court for acts
constituting serious violations
of international humanitarian
law under the present Statute,
for which he or she has already
been tried by the International
Tribunal…”
A person who has been tried by
a national court for acts
constituting serious violations
of international humanitarian
law may be subsequently tried
by the ad hoc tribunal, but only
if: 
(a) the act for which he or she
was tried was characterized as
an ordinary crime; or
(b) the national court
proceedings were not impartial
or independent, were designed
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military may have waived
jurisdiction for that crime,
although it may be possible to
charge the individual for
another crime arising from the
same conduct.  See 54 AM.
JUR. 2D, Military and Civil
Defense §§ 227-28.
responsibility, or the case was
not diligently prosecuted.
ICTY Stat. art. 10; ICTR Stat.
art. 9.
“When...criminal proceedings
have been instituted against a
person before a court of any
State for a crime for which that
person has already been tried
by the Tribunal, a Trial
Chamber shall…issue a
reasoned order requesting that
court permanently to
discontinue its proceedings. If
that court fails to do so, the
ICTY President may report the
matter to the Security
Council.” ICTY Rule 13; ICTR
Rule 13.
However, the prosecution can
seek to appeal an acquittal,
including based on the
CRS-23
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discovery a new fact that was
unknown at the time of the
proceedings but that could have
been decisive.  ICTY Stat. art.






the right to a speedy
and public trial, ....”
Amendment VI. 
Trial is to commence within
seventy days of indictment or
original appearance before
court.  
18 U.S.C. § 3161.
Closure of the courtroom
during trial proceedings is
justified only if 1) the
proponent of closure advances
an overriding interest likely to
be prejudiced; 2) the closure is
no broader than necessary; 3)
the trial court considers
reasonable alternatives to
closure; and 4) the trial court
makes findings adequate to
support closure. See Waller v.
Georgia, 467 U.S. 39, 48
In general, accused must be
brought to trial within 120 days
of the preferral of charges or
the imposition of restraint,
whichever date is earliest.
R.C.M. 707(a).
The right to a public trial
applies in courts-martial but is
not absolute. 
R.C.M. 806.
The military trial judge may
exclude the public from
portions of a proceeding for the
purpose of protecting classified
information if the prosecution
demonstrates an overriding
need to do so and the closure is
The IMT was to ensure
expeditious proceedings,
although this principle was not
framed in terms of the rights of
the accused.  The IMT was to
“take strict measures to prevent
any action which will cause
unreasonable delay, and rule
out irrelevant issues and
statements of any kind




including exclusion of any
Defendant or his Counsel from
some or all further
proceedings, but without
prejudice to the determination
The accused has the right “to
be tried without undue delay.”
ICTY Stat. art. 21; ICTR Stat.
art. 20.
Proceedings are to be public
unless otherwise provided.
ICTY Rule 78; ICTR Rule 78.
“The press and the public
[may] be excluded from all or
part of the proceedings for
reasons of: 
(i) public order or morality;
(ii) safety, security or non-
disclosure of the identity of a
victim or witness...; or
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(1984). no broader than necessary.
United States v. Grunden, 2
M.J. 116 (CMA 1977).
of the charges.”   IMT Charter
art. 18; IMTFE Charter art. 12.
The IMT was to rule in open
court upon all questions arising
during the trial, although it
could deliberate certain matters
in closed proceedings.
IMT Rule 8.  The IMTFE rules
permitted the tribunal, “when
necessary, [to] order the
closing or clearing of the court
and take any other steps which
to the Tribunal seem just.”
IMTFE Rule 5.
Provision was made for the
publication of all proceedings
in multiple languages.
IMT Charter art. 25.
At the Tokyo Tribunal, “[s]o
much of the record and of the
proceedings may be translated
ICTY Rule 79; ICTY Rule 79.
CRS-25
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into Japanese as the Tribunal
considers desirable in the
interest of justice and for the








of each element of a
crime beyond a
reasonable doubt.
In re Winship, 397
U.S. 358 (1970).
Defendant is entitled to jury
instructions clarifying that the
prosecution has the burden of
presenting evidence sufficient
to prove guilt beyond a
reasonable doubt.  
Cool v. United States, 409 U.S.
100 (1978).
Members of court martial must
be instructed that the burden of
proof to establish guilt is upon
the government and that any
reasonable doubt must be
resolved in favor of the
defendant.  R.C.M. 920(e).
The IMT could “admit any
evidence which it deem[ed] to
be of probative value.” IMT
Charter art. 19; IMTFE Rule
13.
Guilty verdicts and sentences
required a majority vote, that
is, three out of four votes.
IMT Charter art. 4.
“A finding of guilt may be
reached only when a majority
of the Trial Chamber is
satisfied that guilt has been
proved beyond reasonable
doubt.” ICTY Rule 87; ICTR
Rule 87.
“A Chamber may admit any
relevant evidence which it
deems to have probative
value,” and “… shall apply
rules of evidence which will
best favour a fair determination
of the matter before it and are
consonant with the spirit of the
Statute and the general
principles of law.”  ICTY Rule
CRS-26
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89; ICTR Rule 89. 
At the ICTY, “A Chamber may
receive the evidence of a
witness orally or, where the
interests of justice allow, in
written form.” ICTY Rule 90.
At the ICTR, “Witnesses shall
… be heard directly by the
Chambers unless [it] has
ordered that the witness be
heard by means of a deposition




 “No person … shall
be compelled in any
criminal case to be a
witness against
Defendant may not be
compelled to testify.  Jury may
not be instructed that guilt may
be inferred from the
defendant’s refusal to testify.
Griffin v. California, 380 U.S.
609 (1965).
No person subject to the UCMJ
may compel any person to
answer incriminating
questions.  Art. 31(a) UCMJ,
10 U.S.C. § 831(a). 
Defendant may not be
Not provided. The accused may not to be
compelled to testify against
himself or to confess guilt.
ICTY Stat. art. 21; ICTR Stat.
art. 20.
“A witness may object to
CRS-27
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himself…”
Amendment V. 
Witnesses may not be
compelled to give testimony
that may be incriminating
unless given immunity for that
testimony.
18 U.S.C. § 6002.
compelled to give testimony
that is immaterial or potentially
degrading.  Art. 31(c), UCMJ,
10 U.S.C. § 831(c).
No adverse inference is to be
drawn from a defendant’s
refusal to answer any questions
or testify at court-martial.  
Mil. R. Evid. 301(f).
Witnesses may not be
compelled to give testimony
that may be incriminating
unless granted immunity for
that testimony by a general
court-martial convening
authority, as authorized by the
Attorney General, if required.
18 U.S.C. § 6002; R.C.M. 704.
making any statement which
might tend to incriminate the
witness. The Chamber may
...compel the witness to answer
the question [but such
testimony] shall not be used as
evidence in a subsequent
prosecution against the witness
for any offence other than false








 “In all criminal
prosecutions, the
accused shall enjoy





Rules of Evidence prohibit
generally the introduction at
trial of statements made out of
court to prove the truth of the
matter stated unless the
declarant is available for cross-
examination at trial (hearsay
rule).  Fed. R. Evid. 801 et seq.
The government is required to
disclose to defendant any
relevant evidence in its
possession or that may become
known through due diligence.
Fed. R. Crim. P. 16.
Hearsay rules apply as in
federal court. Mil. R. Evid. 801
et seq.  
In capital cases, sworn
depositions may not be used in
lieu of witness, unless court-
martial is treated as non-capital
or it is introduced by the
defense.  Art. 49, UCMJ, 10
U.S.C. § 849.
Defendants had the right “to
present evidence at the Trial in
support of [their] defense, and
to cross-examine any witness
called by the Prosecution.”
IMT Charter art. 16(d), IMTFE
Charter art. 15.
Hearsay was not strictly
prohibited.  The judges were
empowered to inquire into the
nature of evidence and
determine its reliability.
IMT Charter art. 20; IMTFE
Charter art. 15 (tribunal to
determine “admissibility” and
“relevance”of evidence).
“A document [was admissible
before the Tokyo Tribunal],
regardless of its security
classification and without
proof of its issuance or
signature, which appears to the
The accused has the right “to
examine, or have examined, the
witnesses against him….”
ICTY Stat. art. 21; ICTR Stat.
art. 20.
Hearsay evidence may be
admissible.  “A Chamber may
admit any relevant evidence
which it deems to have
probative value. ... A Chamber
may exclude evidence if its
probative value is substantially
outweighed by the need to
ensure a fair trial.”
ICTY Rule 89.
“A Trial Chamber may admit,
in whole or in part, the
evidence of a witness in the
form of a written statement in
lieu of oral testimony which
goes to proof of a matter other
than the acts and conduct of the
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Tribunal to have been signed or
issued by any officer,
department, agency or member
of the armed forces of any
government.” IMTFE Charter
art. 13.
accused as charged in the
indictment.”
ICTY Rule 92 bis.
Unsworn written testimony and
transcripts are admissible only
under certain circumstances,
including where the declarant
is unavailable but there are
sufficient indicia of reliability
to satisfy the court. Id.  
The ICTY has held that out-of
court statements that are
relevant and found to have
probative value are admissible
but that judges may be guided
by “hearsay exceptions
generally recognised by some
national legal systems, as well
as the truthfulness,
voluntariness and
trustworthiness of the evidence,
as appropriate.” Prosecutor v.
CRS-30
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Tadic, Case No.IT-94-1-T,
Decision on Defense Motion















Defendants have the right to
subpoena witnesses to testify in
their defense.  The court may
punish witnesses who fail to
appear.  Fed. R. Crim. Pro.
Rule 17.
Defendants before court-
martial have the right to
compel appearance of
witnesses necessary to their
defense.  R.C.M. 703.
Process to compel witnesses in
court-martial cases is to be
similar to the process used in
federal courts.  Art. 46, UCMJ,
10 U.S.C. § 846.
The defense had an opportunity
to apply to the Tribunal for the
production of witnesses or of
documents by written
application stating where the
witness or document was
thought to be located and the
facts proposed to be proved. 
The Tribunal had the discretion
to grant applications and seek
to have evidence made
available by cooperating states.
IMT Rule 4; IMTFE Charter
art. 9.
The accused has the right “to
examine, or have examined, the
witnesses against him and to
obtain the attendance and
examination of witnesses on
his behalf under the same
conditions as witnesses against
him.”  ICTY Stat. art. 21;
ICTR Stat. art. 20.
Right to Trial by
Impartial Judge
 “The Judicial
The independence of the
judiciary from the other
branches was established to
ensure trials are decided
A qualified military judge is
detailed to preside over the
court-martial.  The convening
authority may not prepare or
Each state party to the London
Agreement establishing the
IMT nominated one judge,
whom they could replace “for
The judges are to be “persons
of high moral character,
impartiality and integrity....”
ICTY Stat. art. 13; ICTR Stat.
CRS-31
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in ...  inferior courts










Article III § 1.
impartially, without the
“potential domination by other
branches of government.”
United States v. Will, 449 U.S.
200, 217-18 (1980).
Judges with a pecuniary
interest in the outcome of a
case  or other conflicts of
interest are disqualified and
must recuse themselves.
28 U.S.C. § 455.
review any report concerning
the performance or
effectiveness of the military
judge.  Art. 26, UCMJ, 10
U.S.C. § 826.
Article 37, UCMJ, prohibits
unlawful influence of courts-
martial through admonishment,
censure, or reprimand of its
members by the convening
authority or commanding
officer, or any unlawful
attempt by a person subject to
the UCMJ to coerce or
influence the action of a court-
martial or convening authority.
Art. 37, UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. §
837. 
reasons of health or for other
good reasons,” except that no
replacement was permitted to
take place during a trial, other
than by an alternate.  IMT
Charter art. 3.
art. 12.
“A Judge may not sit on a trial
or appeal in any case in which
the Judge has a personal
interest or concerning which
the Judge has or has had any
association which might affect
his or her impartiality.”
ICTY Rule 15; ICTR Rule 15.
Right to Trial By
Impartial Jury 
“The Trial of all
Crimes, except in
The pool from which juries are
drawn must represent a fair
cross section of the
community. Taylor v.
Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522
A military accused has no
Sixth Amendment right to a
trial by petit jury.  Ex Parte
Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 39-40
(1942) (dicta).
There was no provision for a
jury trial.
The ICTY and ICTR follow the
civil law tradition of employing
a panel of judges to decide
questions of both fact and law. 
There is no provision for trial
CRS-32
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Cases of
Impeachment, shall
be by Jury; ....”




the right to a ... trial,
by an impartial jury
of the state ....”
Amendment VI. 
(1975).
There must further be measures
to ensure individual jurors
selected are not biased (i.e., the
voir dire process).  Lewis v.
United States, 146 U.S. 370
(1892); see Fed. R. Crim. P. 24
(peremptory challenges).
The trial must be conducted in
a manner designed to avoid
exposure of the jury to
prejudicial material or undue
influence.  If the locality of the
trial has been so saturated with
publicity about a case that it is
impossible to assure jurors will
not be affected by prejudice,
the defendant is entitled to a
change of venue.  Irvin v.
Dowd, 366 U.S. 717 (1961).
However, “Congress has
provided for trial by members
at a court-martial.”  United
States v. Witham, 47 MJ 297,
301 (1997); Art. 25, UCMJ, 10
U.S.C. § 825.
The Sixth Amendment
requirement that the jury be
impartial applies to court-
martial members and covers
not only the selection of
individual jurors, but also their
conduct during the trial
proceedings and the subsequent
deliberations. United States v.
Lambert, 55 M.J. 293 (2001).
The absence of a right to trial
by jury precludes criminal trial
of civilians by court-martial.
Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1
(1957); Kinsella v. United
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 “The Privilege of
the Writ of Habeas
Corpus shall not be
suspended, unless





Article I § 9 cl. 2.
 Originally, the writ of habeas
corpus permitted collateral
attack upon a prisoner’s
conviction only if the
sentencing court lacked subject
matter jurisdiction. It later
evolved into an avenue for the
challenge of federal and state
convictions on other due
process grounds,  to determine
whether a prisoner’s detention
is “contrary to the Constitution
or laws or  treaties of the
United States.”  28 U.S.C. §§
2241 et seq. 
The writ of habeas corpus
provides the primary means by
which those sentenced by
military court, having
exhausted military appeals, can
challenge a conviction or
sentence in a civilian court. 
The scope of matters that a
court will address is more
narrow than in challenges of
federal or state convictions.
Burns v. Wilson, 346 U.S. 137
(1953).
However, Congress created a
civilian court, the Court of
Appeals for the Armed Forces,
to review military cases.
None.  “The judgment of the
Tribunal as to the guilt or the
innocence of any Defendant
shall give the reasons on which
it is based, and shall be final
and not subject to review.”
IMT Charter art. 26.
The Control Council for
Germany was empowered to
reduce or otherwise alter the
sentences, but could not
increase its severity.
IMT Charter art. 29.
General MacArthur had similar
authority with respect to
decisions of the IMTFE.
IMTFE Charter art. 17.
The ICTY Statute creates an
Appeals Chamber, which may
hear appeals from convicted
persons or from the prosecutor
on the grounds of “an error on
a question of law invalidating
the decision,” or “an error of
fact which has occasioned a
miscarriage of justice.”




The death penalty is not per se
unconstitutional, but its
Death may only be adjudged
for certain crimes where the
Penalties included “death or
such other punishment as shall
Penalties are limited to
imprisonment; there is no death
CRS-34
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imposition may be, and the
death penalty may not be
automatic.  See Gregg v.
Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976);
18 U.S.C.§ 3592 (mitigating
/aggravating circumstances).
When the death penalty may be
imposed, the defendant shall be
provided a list of potential
jurors and witnesses, unless the
court finds that such action
might jeopardize the life or
safety of any person. 18 U.S.C.
§ 3432.
A special hearing is held to
determine whether the death
sentence is warranted.
18 U.S.C. § 3593.
defendant is found guilty by
unanimous vote of court-
martial members present at the
time of the vote.  Prior to
arraignment, the trial counsel
must give the defense written
notice of aggravating factors
the prosecution intends to
prove.  R.C.M. 1004.
A conviction of spying during
time of war under article 106,
UCMJ, carries a mandatory
death penalty.
10 U.S.C. § 906.
be determined by [the IMT] to
be just.”  IMT Charter art. 27;
IMTFE Charter art. 16.
The IMT at Nuremberg could
also order the convicted person
to deliver any stolen property
to the Control Council for
Germany.  IMT Charter art. 28.
penalty. The ICTY may also
order the return of any property
and proceeds acquired by
criminal conduct to their
rightful owners. ICTY Stat. art.
24; ICTR Stat. art. 23.
Sentences are to be imposed
consistently with the general
practice regarding prison
sentences in the courts of the
former Yugoslavia or Rwanda,
taking into account such factors
as the gravity of the offence
and the individual
circumstances of the convicted
person. ICTY Stat. art. 24;
ICTR Stat. art. 23.
